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BOOK  REVIEW
THE  UNCONSCIONABLE  WAR  ON
MORAL CONSCIENCE
ROBERT P. GEORGE, CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES:
CONFRONTING THE DOGMAS OF LIBERAL SECULARISM.
By Robert P. George.  Wilmington: ISI Books. 2013.
Michael Stokes Paulsen*
I. THE MAN, THE BOOK, THE THEME, AND A PROPOSITION
Robert George is fearless and relentless.  He is arguably the leading con-
servative academic public intellectual writing today.  George, who holds the
prestigious McCormick Chair in Jurisprudence at Princeton University and is
an occasional visiting professor at Harvard Law School, is no one to be trifled
with: he is dauntingly smart and a formidable debater, in print (as demon-
strated powerfully by the book that is the subject of this review) or in person.
(I have participated in public events in which George participated as a
* Distinguished University Chair & Professor of Law, The University of St. Thomas
(Minneapolis, Minnesota).  My thanks to the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for the
invitation to publish this review, for their patience with my slowness in completing it, and
for their skill in editing and checking it.  I am grateful for the helpful comments of John
Nagle, Rick Garnett, Kevin Walsh, and Sam Barr on earlier drafts.  (All errors are my fault,
of course.)
The reader should be aware that Professor Robert George is a longtime professional
acquaintance and friend of mine.  We frequently (though not invariably) find ourselves on
the same side of public and legal interpretive controversies and have even written together
as coauthors. E.g., Robert P. George & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Authorize Force Now, NAT’L
REV. (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/371512/authorize-force-
now-robert-p-george-michael-stokes-paulsen; Michael Stokes Paulsen & Robert P. George,
President Obama’s Dishonest and Unconstitutional De-Authorization, PUB. DISCOURSE (Mar. 2,
2015), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/03/14560/.  For some, this might tend
to discredit a largely sympathetic review.  That is a risk I have no choice but to accept.  All I
can offer by way of assurance to the skeptical is that the nature of our friendship is such
that I would gladly—cheerfully, even gleefully!—attack Robert George in print if and for
whatever reason I felt he deserved it.  And George would cheerfully, even gleefully,
encourage it, and give back as good as he gets.  (“Bring it on, Brother Paulsen,” I hear him
saying in my head.)
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speaker or panelist.)  He is astonishingly well versed in law, philosophy, his-
tory, religion, and public affairs.  He writes with charm, grace, and wit.  And
he pulls no punches: George is widely known for his unreserved and
unashamed defense of traditional moral values, religious conviction and
religious freedom, marriage as the union of husband and wife, and the right
to life of the unborn.  He is a cheerful and genteel—but uncompromising—
intellectual controversialist.
Professor George’s Conscience and Its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of
Liberal Secularism, is a broad-ranging defense of natural law, moral reasoning,
traditional values, and religious liberty and a no-holds-barred attack on those
who would assault these cherished things.  The book is in part a collection of
previously published essays on a wide variety of philosophical topics, contem-
porary public controversies, and notable public personalities ranging the
spectrum from Harry Blackmun to G.E.M. Anscombe.  Unlike so many “col-
lection” books that strain to squeeze disparate essays under a contrived
umbrella theme—we have all encountered such volumes, and sometimes
labored to read them—Professor George succeeds in shaping a variety of spe-
cific topics into an overall unity of vision and purpose.
This is a book, fundamentally, about irreducible conflict and fundamental
choices.  As its title suggests, the book focuses on the dual themes of con-
science—what forms it, what values it should embrace, the relationship of con-
science to true religious conviction—and, in George’s arresting choice of
terms, its enemies.  A short review cannot possibly do justice to the full range
of the book’s twenty-eight chapters, each of which works well as a standalone
essay.  Much of what George has to say—about education,1 about the good
life,2 about formation of moral values,3 about contemporary policy debates
over issues implicating fundamental values of rights and wrong4—I will leave
more or less untouched.  But not unappreciated: on all of these topics, and
others, the book’s essays are remarkably good.5
Instead, in this short review I will evaluate the book’s global themes of
conscience and conflict through the lens of three paradigmatic illustra-
tions—cases of conflict specifically between religious conscience and the
authority of the state.  In each instance, the claim of conscience consists of the
claimed right of individuals (or groups) to resist the authority of the state
1 See ROBERT P. GEORGE, CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES 27–41 (2013).
2 See, e.g., id. at 118.
3 See id. at 3–13, 23–26.
4 See id. at 126–208.
5 The short personal biographical reviews and tributes—eulogies, sometimes—of
prominent and a few less-well-known persons, which comprise Part IV of the book, entitled
“Good Guys . . . and Not So Good Guys,” see id. at 207–60, are truly wonderful.  These
personal tributes (and tear-downs) are charming and thoughtful, uncommonly readable,
and charitable and respectful even to the “not-so-good” guys as persons.  Other highlights:
Chapter 9 (“Why Moral Truths Matter”), id. at 91–105, Chapter 10 (“Two Concepts of
Liberty . . . and Conscience”), id. at 106–14, and Chapter 11 (“Religious Liberty: A Funda-
mental Human Right”), id. at 115–25, are each extraordinary.  Each stands on its own as a
distinguished essay on its topic.
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over their faith-driven conduct.  In each instance, the claim involves a refusal,
on grounds of religious conviction, to engage in conduct that the religious
adherent considers either morally wrong in itself or that would constitute—
in the religious adherent’s scheme of things—participating in, assisting,
endorsing, facilitating, or being the vehicle for the commission of a morally
wrongful act by another.
But in each instance, something a bit more seems to be present as well.
In each instance I will discuss, the claim of conscience also might be thought
partly “symbolic”—a claimed conscientious objection precisely to the state’s
claim of authority to override religious conscience.  It is conscientious resis-
tance (at least in part) for the sake of vindicating the right of conscientious resis-
tance itself—that is, for the sake of protecting the right actually to exercise the
right of conscientious refusal in a specific situation.  It is an act of standing
on principle for the sake of standing on principle.  It is, to coin a phrase, an
assertion of “meta-conscience.”
Similarly, on the other side of the conflict, in each case the claim of
authority on behalf of the state is in part about the underlying substantive
social policy that the state is seeking to command or enforce and which the
conscientious resister seeks to avoid.  But in each case there is actually some-
thing more going on: the claim of authority frequently reduces to the state’s
“symbolic” interest precisely in vindicating its own authority as against the
claimed right to defy such authority.  That is, it is a claim of state authority to
prevail over claims of conscience largely for the sake either of authority itself
or for the sake of (what amounts to the same thing) coercing compliance
with, cooperation in, and assent to the state’s ideology.  It is a claimed power
to compel conformity and assent, even where the state could accomplish its policy
purposes without imposing such compulsions to act in violation of conscience.  It is, to
coin another phrase, an assertion of “meta-authority.”
In short, the controversies on which I will focus are those in which there
is a direct conflict as a matter of principle between the authority of the state
to command and the freedom of the citizen to resist such a command as a
matter of principle—head-to-head conflicts between abstract “conscience”
and its “enemies.”  There is usually more to the conflict than that, of course.
In each case, there is an underlying substantive issue that triggers the dispute
between the claimants of conscience and the avatars of authority.  But in
each of the instances I will discuss, the dispute distills to conscience, for its
own sake, versus authority, for its.
My thesis in this review builds on and is inspired in part by George’s
book: Where, or to the extent that, a conflict between conscience and
authority reduces to a pure stand on principle by each side—sincere con-
science for its sake versus authority for its—in a free society conscience
should almost always win.  The only time that claims of government authority
should triumph over genuine claims of religious conscience is when relig-
iously motivated conduct would produce essentially intolerable harm to
others—harm of a kind and degree that would lead one to conclude (in
effect, not literally) that it is inconceivable that a just and good God, rightly
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understood, possibly could have commanded such conduct, and that it is
necessary for the state to reject the religious claim in order to prevent such
intolerable harm to others.6  That should be a highly unusual case.  In most
instances of claimed religious conduct, the stakes are not nearly so high.  Fre-
quently, they involve not much more than a claim of state authority to sup-
press the exercise of religious conscience simply because the state finds
threatening in principle the idea of conscientious resistance to its com-
mands.  Where that is the case, I submit, there is only one possible answer.
Sincere religious conscience should always prevail over claims of government
authority that reduce to the asserted need to vindicate government authority
for its own sake.
II. THE FLAG SALUTE CASES: GOBITIS AND BARNETTE
The perfect illustration of this proposition comes from the Jehovah’s
Witness “flag salute” cases of the 1940s. Minersville School District v. Gobitis,7
decided in 1940, is arguably the worst Supreme Court majority opinion in a
6 This is a strict standard that I have defended in other writing. See Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1206–1216
(2013) [hereinafter Paulsen, The Priority of God].  Professor George defends something very
much like it in Conscience and Its Enemies, in a chapter entitled “Religious Freedom: A Fun-
damental Human Right.” See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 115–25.  George grounds religious
freedom—and thus also its limits—in the good of religion itself and the dignity of all human
persons. Id. at 124–25.  It thus follows that “[g]ross evil—even grave injustice” (as judged by
absolute moral standards of right and wrong derived ultimately from God’s law and from
natural law), committed in the name of religion against other persons, simply cannot be
protected without contradicting the premises justifying religious freedom: “To suppose
otherwise is to back oneself into the awkward position of supposing that violations of relig-
ious freedom (and other injustices of equal gravity) must be respected for the sake of
religious freedom.” Id. at 124–25; see also id. at 71–90 (chapter entitled “Natural Law, God,
and Human Dignity”).
While Professor George adopts a broad understanding of the scope of religious free-
dom as a fundamental human right, in other writing he has made clear that he does not
believe that the language of the U.S. Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause embraces such an
understanding as a constitutional right.  Rather, he has embraced the view that the Constitu-
tion’s ban on laws “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion does not provide the individ-
ual religious adherent (or group) a right to exemption from facially religion-neutral laws
of general applicability—the same position that the U.S. Supreme Court embraced in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–90 (1990). See Robert P. George, Protecting
Religious Liberty in the Next Millennium: Should We Amend the Religion Clauses of the Constitu-
tion?, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 27, 32 (1998).
The two positions are not in conflict.  One can believe in a broad, natural human
right to religious freedom as a matter of natural law and sound public policy without
believing that a specific legal text embraces that understanding to its fullest.  For reasons I
have explained elsewhere, however, I believe that the text of the Free Exercise Clause—
and the very fact of its presence in the Constitution—makes little sense except on the
premise that it adopts the natural-rights understanding of religious freedom as a right
prior to and superior in obligation to the usual commands of the state. See Paulsen, The
Priority of God, supra, at 1160–62; 1181–89.
7 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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First Amendment case, ever. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,8
decided in 1943 and repudiating Gobitis in substantial respects, is almost uni-
versally regarded as one of the very best First Amendment opinions ever pro-
duced by the Supreme Court.  For framing the issue of conscience versus
authority there is no better pairing of cases.9
In Gobitis, the Court upheld the expulsion from public school of a
twelve-year-old girl, Lillian Gobitas,10 and her ten-year-old brother, William,
for refusing to make an affirmation of political faith that violated their fam-
ily’s Jehovah’s Witness religious faith—saluting the flag and reciting the
Pledge of Allegiance.11  The Gobitis family’s religious beliefs viewed such acts
of affirmation and salute to be idolatrous—the compelled worship of
another god rather than God, forbidden by the family’s understanding of the
Second Commandment of the Decalogue.12  The Gobitises argued that com-
pelling their children’s participation in the flag salute violated both the Free
Exercise of Religion and the Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.
Justice Felix Frankfurter’s majority opinion—his first major constitu-
tional opinion as a Justice13—rejected both arguments.  His opinion starts
this way, adopting a tone of solemnity tinged with a presumption of state
power:
A grave responsibility confronts this Court whenever in course of litiga-
tion it must reconcile the conflicting claims of liberty and authority.  But
when the liberty invoked is liberty of conscience, and the authority is author-
ity to safeguard the nation’s fellowship, judicial conscience is put to its sever-
est test.14
For Frankfurter, the case presented a question not of immutable constitu-
tional principle but one of balancing—of reconciling competing claims: “Our
present task, then, as so often the case with courts, is to reconcile two rights
in order to prevent either from destroying the other.”15
8 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
9 For a fuller discussion of these cases, see MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN & LUKE PAULSEN,
THE CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION 185–217 (2015) (discussing Gobitis and Barnette as
paradigmatic First Amendment controversies of the mid-twentieth century Supreme
Court).
10 The family’s name is misspelled in the court records.  For convenience, I will follow
the Court’s misspelling of “Gobitis.”
11 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591–92, 600.
12 Id. at 590, 592 & n.1.
13 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY
1888–1986, at 267 (1990).
14 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591.
15 Id. at 594.  The “balancing” approach to constitutional adjudication is intellectually
lazy and, typically, analytically sloppy.  A few constitutional provisions are phrased as stan-
dards rather than rules and may well admit of “balancing”-type judgments. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. amend IV (“unreasonable” search and seizures); id. amend. VIII (“cruel and unu-
sual” punishments).  But that does not warrant such an approach all the time, for every
provision of the Constitution.  Instead, interpreters must do the (harder) work of ascer-
taining a provision’s meaning, scope, and boundaries rather than engaging in unfocused
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL307.txt unknown Seq: 6  4-APR-16 13:25
1172 notre dame law review [vol. 91:3
On one side of this constitutional teeter-totter was religious liberty and
conscience.  But on the other side was, for Frankfurter, the true heavyweight:
state authority.  And not just any authority, but the government’s authority to
safeguard “the nation’s fellowship,” a characterization (somewhat ironically)
heavy with quasi-religious overtones of its own.  The balance to be struck
almost seems to be between competing gods: the God of religious conviction
versus the state’s authority to command adherence to the political faith of
the community.
The opening words of Gobitis strike a posture of judicial handwringing
over the profound difficulty of resolving such a conflict.  Yet reduced to its
essentials, Frankfurter’s position was that wherever there exists a conflict
between religious conscience and the ultimate authority of the state, relig-
ious conscience necessarily must yield: “The mere possession of religious convic-
tions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the
citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.”16  This sentence is the
lynchpin of the entire opinion, and it is a bad one in two respects.  First, it
unfairly diminishes the conscience side of the balance.  Second, it practically
assumes that any and all commands of state authority necessarily prevail over
religious conscience.
Whether intentionally or not, Frankfurter’s formulation strikes a dismis-
sive stance toward religious conscience.  It declines to take seriously on its
own terms the primacy of religious convictions for the committed religious
believer.  Instead, Frankfurter treats religious convictions as, essentially, a
species of mere personal preference.  They are “mere” personal beliefs, enti-
tled to no particular special treatment.  This stacks the deck against religious
conscience in Frankfurter’s balancing project.  After all, isn’t subordination
of mere personal preferences to the common good, as understood by politi-
cal society, kind of what law is all about?  Subordinating individual prefer-
ences—including religious convictions—to the agreed interests of society is
simply the price of citizenship.
Frankfurter’s perspective on religious conviction is that of the quintes-
sential modern secular liberal: There is no such thing as religious truth.
Indeed, there are no objectively right answers at all to moral, religious, or
philosophical questions, and thus no proper basis for moral absolutism.  Just
a few paragraphs later, for example, Frankfurter writes that “no single princi-
ple can answer all of life’s complexities.”17  (Except, presumably, that one.)
This skeptical relativist stance colors Frankfurter’s account of the reason
for protecting religious liberty.  The idea of freedom of religion, Frankfurter
writes, “is itself the denial of an absolute.”18  We protect religious freedom,
Frankfurter suggests, not for the sake of the intrinsic importance of protect-
policy balancing.  Rights and powers have limits, but in a written constitution, those limits
are determined by the meaning of the words of the text containing them, not by ad hoc
judicial weighing and balancing.
16 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594–95 (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 594.
18 Id.
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ing the free pursuit of religious truth, but precisely because there is no such
thing as religious truth.  Religious freedom does not exist because of the
importance of true religious faith and the freedom to pursue it without gov-
ernment interference.  Religious freedom is recognition not just of religious
pluralism (the unavoidable fact of human disagreement over religious truth)
but of religious relativism (the supposed inherent subjectivity of religious
faith and the absence of religious “truth”).19
Frankfurter’s view of religion as subjective personal belief and of relig-
ious freedom as premised on the absence of religious truth naturally affected
(some might say infected) his view of religious conscience, as it would for any-
one holding such views.  To the committed secularist, religious belief is
irreducibly a matter of personal choice and preference (and perhaps a
quaint, anti-intellectual one at that).  To privilege such a person’s “concep-
tion of religious duty” over “the secular interests of his fellow-men” would
push toleration of religion too far.20  The Gobitis children and parents were
free to believe whatever they liked (and “liked” seems an apt word).  That
much was and remains standard modern liberalism.  But it was not as if their
desire to refrain from pledging allegiance and saluting the flag was some-
thing more than a purely personal choice—“mere” conscience, in Frankfurter’s
term.21  In the world of Gobitis, conscience is a malleable byproduct of indi-
vidual autonomy, not an immutable command of moral duty.
This is a fundamentally mistaken starting point.  This is not what con-
science is about, as Professor George makes clear.  While not writing specifi-
19 This is a peculiarly modern (and historically anachronistic) perspective on the rea-
son for the Constitution’s protection of religious liberty.  Those who adopted the First
Amendment do not appear, in the main, to have embraced religious liberty out of a convic-
tion that there is no such thing as religious truth.  Though there were indeed some who so
believed, for most men and women of the time the value of religious freedom flowed from
the conviction that there is such a thing as religious truth and that the freedom to pursue
that truth—guided only by one’s own conscience, convictions, and reason, whether indi-
vidual or shaped by religious communities—was one of the most fundamental and valuable
liberties of all.  Religious freedom was an inalienable private right.  It was a right preceding
the social compact of government, not capable of being assigned into the hands of govern-
ment, and over which government could never rightfully assert any authority whatever.
This was not due to some great and abiding skepticism over the possibility of religious
truth—that is a modern and post-modern condition (or pathology)—but because govern-
ment was understood to have no right to determine, prescribe or dictate what the truth is.
I have developed these ideas in other writing. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Great,
Garvey Is Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597, 1609–25
(1997) [hereinafter Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is Good] (reviewing JOHN H. GARVEY,
WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996)); Paulsen, The Priority of God, supra note 6, at 183–84.
20 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 593.  I have discussed and criticized this view of religion, and the
corresponding view of religious freedom. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Religious
Freedom Irrational?, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1043 (2014) (reviewing BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE
RELIGION? (2013)).
21 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594–95 (“The mere possession of religious convictions which con-
tradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the
discharge of political responsibilities.” (emphasis added)).
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cally about Frankfurter or the flag salute cases, George explains that true
conscience is practically the opposite of subjective individual autonomy.22  Con-
science is not, George maintains, a function of individual “ ‘autonomy’ in the
modern liberal sense.”  It is “not a writer of permission slips.”23  It is “the very
opposite” of a projection of the will of the individual.  Rather, conscience is
one’s last best judgment specifying the bearing of moral principles one
grasps, yet in no way makes up for oneself, on concrete proposals for action.
Conscience identifies one’s duties under the moral law.  It speaks of what
one must do and what one must not do.  Understood in this way, conscience
is indeed what [Cardinal] Newman said it is: a stern monitor.24
Such an understanding contrasts markedly with the modern, “counter-
feit” conception of conscience as “self-will,” which is “concerned not so much
with identifying what one has a duty to do or not do, one’s feelings and
desires to the contrary notwithstanding, but rather with sorting out one’s
feelings.”25
Conscience, properly understood, is about irreducible, unavoidable
moral duties flowing from commands coming from outside one’s own will.
Conscience is not about what the individual subjectively decides for himself
or herself—the modern, secular understanding.  But given the Gobitis
Court’s misunderstanding of conscience, its conclusion that conscience must
yield to authority is entirely unsurprising: When the free exercise of faith
“collides with the felt necessities of society”—that is, whenever religious faith
commands of its adherent conduct not in accord with what “society thinks
necessary for the promotion of some great common end”26—the claim of
religious conscience always loses.
So too with any claim to refuse to make an affirmation premised on the
freedom of speech, Frankfurter concludes for the Court: The right to disa-
gree must be subordinated to the right of government to force submission to
its authority, for the sake of society as a whole.  It is here where the Gobitis
opinion is at its very worst.
“The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive
sentiment,” Frankfurter writes.27  “National unity is the basis of national
security” and, thus, the flag salute ceremony served an interest “inferior to
none in the hierarchy of legal values.”28  It followed that the state could
instill “cohesive sentiment” by coercing children to submit, by public affirma-
tion, to the state’s authority.29  It was important to instill such sentiment
while children were still at an age when “their minds are supposedly recep-
tive” to “assimilation” of such values, and to deploy the “compulsions which
22 GEORGE, supra note 1, at 112–13.
23 Id. at 112.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 593.
27 Id. at 596.
28 Id. at 595.
29 Id. at 596.
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necessarily pervade so much of the educational process” for the purposes of
“inculcating” the right values and overcoming religious values taught at
home—to “awaken in the child’s mind” views “contrary to those implanted
by the parent.”30
According to Gobitis, the state’s interest in vindicating its authority over
claims of conscience is paramount, precisely for the sake of vindicating such
authority and promoting cohesive sentiment in support of the state.  On such
a view, religious conscience is almost literally the enemy of the state!  Over-
powering the resistance of religious conscience to state authority is thus one
of the most vital functions of state education.
To call this a disturbing set of propositions is an understatement.  As my
coauthor, Luke Paulsen, and I have written elsewhere of Gobitis:
It would be difficult to find a judicial opinion more thoroughly contrary
to the values of the First Amendment.  The toxic idea that government must
possess power to suppress religious differences and compel individuals to
express the state’s preferred ideology practically screams out its own refuta-
tion.  The utterly pernicious idea that the state may use the compulsion of
young children—“its children,” the Court called them—as a way to manufac-
ture the “cohesive” society the state prefers is eerily authoritarian, even
Hitlerian, in its statist implications.  It is, in its own way, totalitarian and un-
American—contrary to the very values the Court thought the Pledge of Alle-
giance would instill.31
The attitude of Gobitis toward religious conscience stands in stark con-
trast to that in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,32 which over-
ruled Gobitis (on the Free Speech Clause issue) just three years later.  Justice
Robert Jackson’s opinion for the Court addresses head-on the reasoning of
Gobitis, and rejects it point by point.  In particular, Jackson’s opinion repudi-
ates the authoritarian argument for overriding conscience in no uncertain
terms.
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many good
as well as by evil men.  Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon but at
other times and places the ends have been racial or territorial security, sup-
port of a dynasty or regime, and particular plans for saving souls. . . . As
governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes
more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. . . . Ultimate futility of such attempts
to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive
to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as
a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to
Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian ene-
mies.  Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves
exterminating dissenters.  Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only
the unanimity of the graveyard.33
30 Id. at 598–600.
31 PAULSEN & PAULSEN, supra note 9, at 231.
32 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
33 Id. at 640–41.
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No wonder Felix Frankfurter dissented—vigorously and at great
length.34  Those who would eliminate dissent by coercion end up “extermi-
nating dissenters”!35  Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only “the
unanimity of the graveyard”!36  These are strong words.  Jackson did not—
quite—call Frankfurter a crypto-Nazi.  But he came rather close, in equating
the premises of the Gobitis opinion with those of our “totalitarian enemies.”37
The flag-salute situation might seem difficult, Jackson continued, “not
because the principles of its decision are obscure but because the flag
involved is our own.”38  But, he concluded, the “freedom to differ is not lim-
ited to things that do not matter much.  That would be a mere shadow of
freedom.  The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch
the heart of the existing order.”39  And then the words that are justly famous:
“[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein.  If there are any circumstances which per-
mit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”40
Jackson framed the issue in Barnette as one of conflict between con-
science and, almost literally, its enemies.  To be sure, Jackson was referring
specifically to the regimes with which the United States was then at war.  Not
all who oppose claims of conscience are totalitarian monsters.  (Jackson
notes that many such efforts have been promulgated by “many good as well
as by evil men.”41)  But the comparison to Nazis was deliberately made, and
presumably not lightly so.  The characterization of those who would suppress
dissent in the name of unity as “enemies” of conscience remains the conclu-
sion: for Jackson (and for the Court in Barnette), the paradigmatic enemies of
conscience are state authorities who would, for its own sake, seek conformity
to the state’s ideological commitments and who would impose such a man-
date against the fundamental moral commitments of dissenting citizens.
* * *
Gobitis and Barnette comprise a powerful parable about the constitutional
law of conscience.  I submit that together they teach enduring truths applica-
ble to today’s controversies.  One can discern at least three broad lessons
from this paradigmatic pair of cases.
First, government must take claims of religious conscience on their own
terms, and treat them with respect.  Conscience, grounded in a claim of
moral duty outside oneself, not personal preference, is of fundamental
34 Frankfurter’s dissent runs some twenty-six pages of the U.S. Reports. See id. at
646–71 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 641 (majority opinion).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 642.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 640.
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importance.  It is not for government to deny or disparage sincere religious
conscience, whether by treating it as something “mere,” or insubstantial, or
by refusing to take seriously on their own terms the moral premises and rea-
soning of the claimants.  Religious conscience is not mere personal prefer-
ence or self-will; it is reasoned moral duty grounded in convictions one
discerns, but does not invent, for oneself.  Government may never simply dis-
miss claims of religious conscience on the ground that they are, under gov-
ernment’s ideology, not proper beliefs to hold or (less arrogantly but more
condescendingly) that people do not properly understand their own faith.42
Second, government has no proper interest in coercing conduct in viola-
tion of conscience—and especially not expressive conduct—simply for the
purpose of requiring individuals to affirm, embrace, or endorse the state’s
ideology.  That is the simple and important lesson of Barnette.  There may be
times where government’s interests in protecting others, or in the public
good, should prevail over claims of religious conscience.43  But the state has
no legitimate interest in overriding private conscience simply for the sake of
symbolically vindicating the state’s authority over private conscience.  The state may
not coerce acts of submission or obeisance to state dogma for their own sake.
A close corollary of this proposition is that if compulsion of acts in violation
of private conscience is not necessary to accomplish even legitimate policy
goals—if the state’s imposition on private conscience is, in effect, gratui-
tous—such compulsion is likewise improper.  In such a case, the state’s justifi-
cation for overriding conscience again reduces to the claim of authority to
compel submission to the state’s prescribed orthodoxy for its own sake, and
not for any other necessary reason.
Third, in evaluating conflicts between private conscience and public
authority, government’s justifications for overriding conscience must be both
extraordinarily important and specific.  Breezy generalizations do not cut it;
nor should government be able to get away with formulating its interests in
an unrealistic, abstract fashion.  The relevant interest in Gobitis and Barnette,
42 As I discuss below with respect to the modern controversy over conscientious resis-
tance to the Obama Administration’s mandate that employer health plans cover contracep-
tion, sterilization, and abortion-inducing drugs, this flawed argument is one of the
principal ones advanced for rejecting the claims of religious conscience: that the beliefs in
question do not make sense to the government. See infra Part III.
43 Defining the outer bounds of constitutional religious liberty is no simple task.  The
text of the Free Exercise Clause is written in seemingly absolute terms, yet one can readily
imagine the existence of circumstances when a religious claim is so implausible, or so intol-
erable in its consequences, that it simply must yield to society’s rules.  The problem of
identifying principled limits to religious freedom is a perennial one.  Indeed, it is fair to say
that it is the central conceptual problem of religious liberty law.  There are textual and
practical problems of differing magnitude with almost any answer one might propose.  For
an imperfect solution, see Paulsen, The Priority of God, supra note 6, at 1206–16 (discussing
this problem at length and proposing a theory of when claims of constitutional religious
liberty might properly be rejected, consistent with the premises that justify religious liberty
in the first place). See also PAULSEN & PAULSEN, supra note 9, at 295–99 (examining contro-
versial free exercise cases).
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for example, was not safeguarding “national security”44 or  protecting “[t]he
ultimate foundation of a free society.”45  It was, rather, the ideological interest
in instilling patriotism in young school children by requiring them to salute
and pledge allegiance to the U.S. flag, notwithstanding their family’s consci-
entious religious objection to doing so.  And that interest was fundamentally
at odds with the premises of First Amendment freedom under the
Constitution.
Nor may government override private conscience even for many seem-
ingly good reasons.  The freedom to differ, Barnette affirms, “is not limited to
things that do not matter much.”46  It includes things “that touch the heart
of the existing order.”47  It follows that government generally ought not to be
able to coerce actions in violation of citizens’ sincere claims of conscience—
moral duty, not mere personal preference—outside the most truly excep-
tional circumstances of grave, almost unthinkable harm to others or to soci-
ety as a whole.48  Mere administrative convenience, mere governmental
preference, and certainly the mere interest in vindicating government’s
authority and the citizen’s submission, clearly do not suffice.
If there is room for debate over these broad principles, there is not
much room.  Nearly everyone today would see the flag salute cases as paradig-
matic illustrations of conflict between conscience and authority, and nearly
everyone today would (or should) agree on which side should win and why.
Gobitis is an anti-canonical First Amendment case and Barnette is its canonical
refutation.  No one today would embrace the full-on anti-conscience stance
of Gobitis.49  No one would insist on subordination of conscience to govern-
ment authority merely for authority’s own sake.  No one would insist on
coercing private conscience in service of government’s ends, when doing so
is utterly unnecessary to achievement of government’s ordinary policy objec-
tives.  No one would defend Gobitis’s denigration of religious conscience, or
the propriety of exaggerating the importance of government’s policy inter-
ests in overriding such conscience.  No one would insist on coercing acts of
affirmation or support for government policy, contrary to conscience, for
44 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940).
45 Id. at 596.
46 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
47 Id.
48 Paulsen, The Priority of God, supra note 6, at 1206–16; Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is
Good, supra note 19, at 1625 (arguing that if a claimant “demonstrates that the law operates
so as to prohibit his exercise of religion in some nontrivial relevant respect, and if accom-
modation of the claim neither imposes substantial burdens on the private rights of others
nor impairs some other interest of paramount importance to the existence of the state, the
religious claimant should win”).
49 Even Employment Division. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which cites Gobitis with
approval for its holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not generally require exemp-
tion from neutral laws of general applicability, see id. at 879, does not embrace the result in
Gobitis as correct. See id. at 890.
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their own sake, or for the symbolism such actions would entail.  No one today
would adopt the stance of an enemy of private conscience.
Would they?
III. CONSCIENCE AND ITS ADVERSARIES TODAY
Conscience and Its Enemies is devoted in part to the large moral controver-
sies of today and the conflicts between conscience and authority framed by
those controversies.  The upshot of Professor George’s positions—the thesis
that emerges from this ensemble of essays, taken as a whole—is that the most
ruthless “enemies” of conscience today are those devotees of the secular
hard-left who would insist on overriding private religious conscience to serve
state ends, whether necessary to the state’s ends or not, precisely in order to
subordinate conscience and vindicate government’s authority to eliminate religious
moral dissent from government ideology and social orthodoxy.
In this Part, I briefly take up two present-day conflicts between con-
science and authority—both involving issues prominent in Professor
George’s book: first, the Obama Administration’s contraception-abortion
insurance coverage mandate, and, second, the threat that same-sex marriage
and attendant antidiscrimination laws pose to the religious liberty of those
who do not wish to support, sponsor, endorse, or participate in such
arrangements.
A. Conscience and Its “Healthcare Insurance Coverage” Enemies
Consider first the issue of forcing religious organizations (or commercial
businesses owned by religious persons and groups) to provide, to assist or
cooperate in providing, or to serve as the vehicle for providing health insurance
coverage for abortion-inducing drugs, sterilization, or contraception to their
students or employees, where facilitating such coverage is contrary to the
religious group’s or business owners’ religious conscience.  “One of the dubi-
ous achievements of the Obama administration,” George writes, “has been to
put the issue of religious freedom and the rights of conscience back on the
agenda in American politics” by imposing such a mandate “upon private
employers, including religious people and even religious institutions” when
“the employer cannot, as a matter of conscience, comply.”50
While the regulatory regime is more complex, the issue of conscience
posed by the insurance-coverage mandate is virtually an exact replay of the
Gobitis-Barnette situation: religious persons and groups wish not to engage in
conduct affirming, supporting, or endorsing that which they think morally
wrong on the basis of profound religious conviction.  Government (some-
times including the courts) disparages or denigrates the claim of conscience.
And, further, government asserts authority to compel such conduct and over-
ride claims of conscience, even where doing so is not necessary to achieve any
ordinary policy objective that could not be accomplished by means other
than coercion of conduct contrary to conscience.  Thus, government’s justifi-
50 GEORGE, supra note 1, at 106.
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cation in the end amounts to little more than a desire to vindicate authority
for authority’s sake.
The coverage-mandate question arises in several variations.  Each varia-
tion, however, flows from administrative interpretation and implementation
of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), colloquially referred to as “Obamacare.”51
To simplify drastically, but not unfairly: the Affordable Care Act requires pri-
vate employers’ health insurance plans to cover “preventive services.”52  Not
all employers’ health plans are covered by the ACA’s requirements, however:
many plans are “grandfathered” exceptions excluded from the ACA’s
requirements;53 plans of employers with fewer than 50 employees are
exempt;54 and certain religious organizations—specifically, churches, syna-
gogues, mosques, and other houses of worship—are also exempt.55
Together, the exceptions exclude tens of millions of employees,56 a notable
fact relevant to the question of how essential it really is to compel the inclu-
sion of objecting religious employers.
The Obama Administration by regulation interpreted “preventive ser-
vices” to require coverage of contraception—including within that term cer-
tain forms of “morning after” or “week after” drugs that likely do not prevent
conception but that instead kill a conceived embryo (or may do so).57  The
51 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.); see also, e.g., Peter Baker,
Democrats Embrace Once Pejorative ‘Obamacare’ Tag, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www
.nytimes.com/2012/08/04/health/policy/democrats-embrace-once-pejorative-obamacare-
tag.html.
52 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 2713, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13
(2012).
53 See id. § 5000a, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 147.140 (2015)
(grandfathered health plan exemption).
54 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1304(b), 1513, 42 U.S.C. § 18024,
26 U.S.C. § 4980.
55 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (establishing an exemption for “religious employers”).
56 See THE WHITE HOUSE, HEALTH REFORM FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 1, https://www.white
house.gov/files/documents/health_reform_for_small_businesses.pdf [hereinafter HEALTH
REFORM FOR SMALL BUSINESSES] (“The law specifically exempts all firms that have fewer
than 50 employees—96 percent of all firms in the United States or 5.8 million out of 6
million total firms—from any employer responsibility requirements.  These 5.8 million
firms employ nearly 34 million workers.”).
57 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762–63 (2014) (“Although
many of the required, FDA-approved methods of contraception work by preventing the
fertilization of an egg, four of those methods (those specifically at issue in these cases) may
have the effect of preventing an already fertilized egg from developing any further by
inhibiting its attachment to the uterus.”); Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issu-
ers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (“[T]he HRSA Guidelines require
coverage . . . for ‘[a]ll Food and Drug Administration [(FDA)] approved contraceptive
methods . . . .” (third and fourth alterations in original)).
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Administration also interpreted “preventive services” to require coverage of
sterilization procedures.58
These requirements often collide with religious beliefs.  Many religious
persons and groups strongly object on moral grounds to committing, sup-
porting, facilitating, sponsoring, or encouraging abortion (including the use
of what are believed to be abortion-inducing drugs).59  Many more persons
and groups object to supporting, facilitating, sponsoring, or encouraging
artificial contraception.60  For persons and groups holding such beliefs, it is
(or may be) improper for the religious believer or group to engage in con-
duct, taking any of a number of forms, that would constitute assisting or facil-
itating what they regard, on religious principle, to be a serious moral
wrong.61  To be forced to engage in such conduct, contrary to religious con-
viction, would, for many, be a grave violation of religious conscience.62
Different religious persons and groups might draw their lines in differ-
ent places concerning what types of conduct constitute improper acts of assis-
tance to, or complicity with, moral wrongdoing.  That is neither surprising
nor in any way suspicious.  It is simply another way of saying that different
people hold different religious convictions.  In particular, different people
hold different religious views concerning what is or is not an act of complicity
in, or facilitation of, moral wrongdoing.  First Amendment law has long rec-
ognized that differences in religious beliefs are common, even within the
same faith tradition, and that the right to the freedom of religious con-
science can never properly depend on a government official’s evaluation of
the consistency, logic, or sensibility of the religious judgments made in good
faith (so to speak) by those holding them.63
58 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2789 (“[T]he HRSA adopted guidelines recom-
mending coverage of ‘[a]ll [FDA-] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization proce-
dures . . . .’” (second and third alterations in original)); Group Health Plans and Health
Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 8725 (“[T]he HRSA Guidelines require cover-
age . . . for ‘[a]ll Food and Drug Administration [(FDA)] approved . . . sterilization
procedures . . . .”).
59 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 9–10, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354)
(“Respondents believe that human beings deserve protection from the moment of concep-
tion, and that providing insurance coverage for items that risk killing an embryo makes
them complicit in abortion.  Hobby Lobby’s health plan therefore excludes drugs that can
terminate a pregnancy.”).
60 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v.
Burwell, Nos. 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2016).
61 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, supra note 59, at 10 (“Respondents’ religious beliefs
will not allow them to do precisely what the contraceptive-coverage mandate demands—
namely, provide in Hobby Lobby’s health plan the four objectionable contraceptive
methods.”).
62 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (“The owners of many closely held corpora-
tions could not in good conscience provide such coverage . . . .”).
63 See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981) (noting that intrafaith differ-
ences are common, that courts “are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation,” and that it is
not open to courts to judge whether an adherent has “correctly perceived the commands”
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Indeed, with respect to essentially this exact question—the need to
respect the lines drawn by religious adherents, as a matter of sincere convic-
tion, with respect to the degree of participation, support, or acquiescence in
the coverage-mandate arrangement sufficient to violate religious principles—
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hobby Lobby was clear:
By requiring the [owners] to arrange for such coverage, the HHS mandate
demands that they engage in conduct that seriously violates their religious
beliefs.
. . .
. . . The [owners] believe that providing the coverage demanded by the HHS
regulations is connected to the destruction of an embryo in a way that is
sufficient to make it immoral for them to provide the coverage.  This belief
implicates a difficult and important question of religion and moral philoso-
phy, namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to per-
form an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or
facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another.  Arrogating the
authority to provide a binding national answer to this religious and philo-
sophical question, HHS and the principal dissent in effect tell the plaintiffs
that their beliefs are flawed.  For good reason, we have repeatedly refused to
take such a step.64
Completing the picture of statutes, regulations, and administrative
actions framing this issue of conscience: As noted, the ACA and regulations
do not require all types of religious groups to comply with the contraception-
sterilization-abortion-drugs mandate.  Religious congregations—churches and
other types of “houses of worship”—are simply not covered.65  With respect
to for-profit commercial businesses owned by religious persons, the ACA and
regulations initially mandated coverage directly in employers’ plans, but the
Supreme Court held in Hobby Lobby that the federal Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act provided a separate exemption from the mandate for persons
(and entities) holding religious conscientious objections to being compelled
to provide such coverage.66
Finally, located somewhere between the situations of churches and for-
profit commercial businesses, the Obama Administration adopted a series of
(changing) “accommodations” for non-church religious organizations like
religiously affiliated colleges and universities, hospitals, and freestanding
religious social service ministry organizations.67  These “accommodations” do
of his faith); id. at 714 (noting that religious beliefs need not be judged “logical [or] con-
sistent” by courts to merit protection); id. at 715 (“We see, therefore, that Thomas drew a
line” and “it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one.”).
64 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775, 2778 (footnote omitted).
65 Health Insurance Reform Requirements for the Group and Individual Health Insur-
ance Markets, 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2015).
66 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759–60 (holding that the mandate’s application to a
closely held, for-profit business violated its owners’ religious freedom under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993).
67 See Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 39870, 39874–88 (July 2, 2013).
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not actually exempt such religious institutions from the mandate.  Rather,
they provide that the mandate is satisfied by an alternative means of com-
pelled compliance: the religious group is required to complete a form
directing its insurance provider to “separately” provide coverage to the relig-
ious organization’s employees covered under its insurance plan.68  The relig-
ious group would not itself be required to provide the coverage violating its
convictions, nor would it be required to pay for such coverage.69  However,
the religious group nonetheless would remain required to direct or trigger the
provision of such coverage by a third party, through its own actions, and the
religious organization’s health insurance plan for its employees would
become the vehicle for the third party’s mandated provision of coverage con-
trary to the religious organization’s religious beliefs.70  For some (but not all)
such organizations, compliance with the “accommodation” is equally a viola-
tion of the organization’s religious convictions.71  Put simply, as noted above,
different organizations draw their lines at different points, in terms of what
actions constitute forbidden complicity in or furtherance of moral wrong.
The issue is thus joined.  On the one side is a claimed right, anchored in
religious conscience, not to cooperate with or acquiesce to the authority of
the state with respect to one’s own conduct on matters that one believes are
controlled by a contrary religious moral imperative.  And on the other side is
the claimed authority of the state to compel such cooperation, overriding
competing claims to conscience as either (1) unworthy or insubstantial, or
(2) simply outweighed in importance by the government’s policy.
The Obama Administration has advanced two principal arguments
against recognizing such claims of religious conscience: First, the Administra-
tion regularly has maintained that there is no genuine violation of religious
conscience (or, in the terms used by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
no “substantial[ ] burden” on religious exercise72) because the degree of
connection—the link—between what the law mandates and any violation of
religious conscience is, in the Administration’s view, too attenuated to be
credited as reasonable and valid.73  Often, such a view is expressed in such
terms as “all that is being asked” is to fill out a form to claim a religious
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 See id. at 39875; 26 C.F.R. § 54.9816-2713A (2015).
71 See, e.g., Complaint at 17–18, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 988 F. Supp. 2d 912
(N.D. Ind. 2013) (No. 3:13-cv-1276) (“This so-called ‘accommodation’, which exists solely
to avoid entities like Notre Dame’s rightful exemption from the Mandate, by definition
binds Notre Dame to the process of providing the objectionable products and services and
thereby fails to address Notre Dame’s sincerely held religious beliefs.”).
72 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(3) (2012).
73 See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 684 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he government
also insists that any burden on the plaintiffs’ religious exercise is too ‘attenuated’ to count
as ‘substantial’ because the provision of contraception coverage is several steps removed
from an employee’s independent decision to use contraception.”).
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accommodation.74  (Sometimes, the argument shades into the suggestion
that the religious group’s religious convictions are simply wrong, mistaken,
or unreasonable.75)  Second, the Administration regularly has maintained
that the claim of religious conscience must be rejected because of the impor-
tance of the mandate—and of the inclusion of the religious group’s employ-
ees within the government’s mandated coverage—to accomplishment of the
government’s policy purposes of providing preventative care in the form of
insurance coverage for contraception, sterilization, and abortion drugs.76
Ultimately, however, the coverage-mandate controversy—very much like
the flag salute mandate in Gobitis and Barnette—reduces to a simple, head-to-
head conflict between conscience as a matter of principle and government’s
interest in vindicating its authority for its own sake.  There is (or should be)
no doubt that the claims of conscience raised in the coverage-mandate con-
troversy are genuine matters of deeply held religious conviction.  The Obama
Administration’s first argument—that the claim of conscience is not a sub-
stantial one, that the degree of connection between the action compelled
and the wrong claimed to result is too attenuated to constitute a valid claim
of religious conscience, and that its claimants misunderstand their own
faith—is legally almost frivolous.77  It is an argument that for whatever reason
either fails to understand or simply refuses to credit the sincere religious
convictions actually possessed by many religious persons and groups.  In this
respect, as noted, it directly contradicts Hobby Lobby (as well as several other
earlier cases).78  It is an embarrassing echo of Felix Frankfurter’s dispar-
74 See, e.g., Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 554 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Sign-
ing the form and mailing it . . . could have taken no more than five minutes.”), vacated and
remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1528 (2015).
75 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014) (“HHS
and the principal dissent in effect tell the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed.”).
76 See, e.g., id. at 2779–80 (noting but not embracing the government’s assertion that
“the contraceptive mandate serves a variety of important interests”).
77 Id. at 2777–78 (categorically rejecting these arguments).
78 See id.; see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981).  Nonetheless,
this argument has received a rather surprising amount of acceptance in lower court deci-
sions, even after Hobby Lobby.  It is hard to explain such a flagrant error.  With all due
respect, what appears to be driving those decisions is either an embarrassing inability of
many federal judges to recognize and credit religious, conscientious beliefs that draw lines
differently from where the judge would draw his or her own lines, or a naked disdain for
religious beliefs with which the judge disagrees or finds unpalatable.  The most notorious
and arrogant judicial offender on this score is probably Judge Richard Posner of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792,
799 (7th Cir. 2015) (“No one is asking Wheaton to violate its religious beliefs.”); Univ. of
Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is for the courts to deter-
mine whether the law actually forces [employers] to act in a way that would violate [their]
beliefs.”).  Posner may be the most brazenly incompetent federal appellate judge in this
regard, but he is hardly alone. See, e.g., Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 435 (3d Cir. 2015) (deciding that courts must “objectively
assess” whether the claimed violation of conscience posed by “the self-certification proce-
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agement of the “mere” conscience of the Jehovah’s Witness believers in
Gobitis.79
If the claim of conscience is therefore a legitimate one, what is the gov-
ernment’s purported justification for overriding it?  It is here that the conflict
reveals itself most clearly to be one with a claim of government authority for
its own sake.  The Obama Administration’s second argument—that its ACA
policy interests override any claim to conscience—is simply not credible in
this context for the simple reason that the government could always provide
the contraception-sterilization-abortion benefit directly, if it wished, to those
the government desired to have that benefit.  There is no need to require
participation, in any form, by persons and groups who object to doing so on
religious grounds.  There is, strictly speaking, no need for government to
involve religious persons and groups, to require such persons or groups to
sign forms directing coverage against conscience, or to conscript such organi-
zations’ employee healthcare plans as the conduit or vehicle for providing
the coverage in question.  To the objection that doing so is a useful and con-
venient way of identifying and providing the contraception coverage to the
religious groups’ employees specifically, there are two obvious responses.
First, that is part of the religious group’s objection—to facilitating or serving
as the vehicle for what it finds morally objectionable.  While a religious
organization could not keep government from providing such a service
dure does, in fact . . . make [the claimant] complicit” in the moral wrong they wish not to
support).
For a concise refutation of this position, see the dissent from denial of rehearing en
banc in the Tenth Circuit, in Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell:
The opinion of the panel majority is clearly and gravely wrong . . . . When a
law demands that a person something the person considers sinful, and the pen-
alty for refusal is a large financial penalty, then the law imposes a substantial bur-
den on that person’s free exercise of religion.  All the plaintiffs in this case
sincerely believe that they will be violating God’s law if they execute the docu-
ments required by the government.  And the penalty for refusal to execute the
documents may be in the millions of dollars.  How can it be any clearer that the
law substantially burdens the plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion?
Yet the panel majority holds otherwise.  Where did it go wrong?  It does not
doubt the sincerity of the plaintiffs’ religious belief.  But it does not accept their
statements of what that belief is. . . . Rather, it reframes their belief.
799 F.3d 1316, 1316–17 (10th Cir. 2015) (Hartz, J., dissenting).
On November 6, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the deci-
sions in seven cases presenting challenges to the N.H.S. contraception-abortion coverage
mandate. See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 446
(2015), granting cert. to 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015); Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), granting cert. to 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014); S. Naza-
rene Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), granting cert. to 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015);
Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), granting cert. to 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015);
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), granting cert. to 772
F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), granting
cert. to 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2015); Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), granting cert. to
778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015).
79 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594–95 (1940).
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directly to a third party, without the religious organization’s involvement,80 it
cannot properly be required to act as the government’s agent in this regard.
The fact that it might be more administratively convenient for the govern-
ment to use the religious organization’s health coverage plan in such fashion
surely does not rise to the level of a compelling interest.  It is a mere bureau-
cratic interest.  Second, it borders on the comical for the government to
claim that it has an overriding interest in covering these specific employees—the
employees of a religious entity—given that the contraception-coverage
excludes tens of millions of persons in any event.81  As noted, the statute and
regulations exempt churches and other houses of worship entirely,82 as well
as “grandfathered” plans83 and plans by employers with fewer than 50
employees.84
What’s left?  Simply this: the government’s interest in requiring religious
groups to cooperate with or facilitate the provision of healthcare coverage to
its employees or students—members of its own ministry or religious commu-
nity—ultimately reduces to an interest in the symbolic vindication of its
authority over what it regards as unjustified claims of conscience.  It is
authority for authority’s sake.
B. Conscience and Its Same-Sex Marriage Enemies
No review of Conscience and Its Enemies would be complete without discus-
sion of the issue of same-sex marriage and the conflicts it poses for religious
conscience.  Robert George is among the nation’s most prominent public
intellectual defenders of traditional marriage between a husband and wife
and a vigorous but respectful opponent of same-sex marriage.  He sets forth
his case for traditional marriage—a case he has made at greater length else-
where—in telescoped form in this book.85  Some will find his arguments con-
80 See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–700 (1986) (“Never to our knowledge has the
Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in ways
that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual development . . . . The Free
Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its
own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. . . .
The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of govern-
mental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the
Government’s internal procedures.”).
81 See HEALTH REFORM FOR SMALL BUSINESSES, supra note 56 (specifying that the ACA
exempts all firms that have fewer than 50 employees).
82 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2015) (religious employer exemption).
83 See id. § 147.140 (grandfathered health plan exemption).
84 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1304(b),
1513, 124 Stat. 119, 172, 253–56 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the
U.S.C.) (small employer exemption).
85 His arguments on this issue are set forth chiefly in a portion of Chapter Nine (“Why
Moral Truths Matter”) under the subheading “What is Marriage?”, GEORGE, supra note 1, at
96–104, and in Chapters Twelve (“What Marriage Is—and What It Isn’t”), id. at 126–41, and
Thirteen (“The Myth of a ‘Grand Bargain’ on Marriage”), id. at 142–46.  Professor George
is co-author of a prominent book defending exclusively traditional marriage. SHERIF
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vincing; others will not.  But whether or not one is persuaded by George’s
arguments for the exclusivity of traditional marriage as the single, proper
social arrangement, it is hard to deny George’s point that the movement for
same-sex marriage in America has created and will continue to create—espe-
cially in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s landmark 2015 decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges recognizing a substantive due process constitutional right
to same-sex marriage86—serious, seemingly inherent, and very nearly intrac-
table conflicts between religious conscience and new secular and legal
norms.
Religious views on the propriety of same-sex marriage differ, but the
short of it is this: orthodox or traditional adherents of the three great
Abrahamic faiths, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, generally oppose homo-
sexual sexual relationships and conduct as seriously inconsistent with the
divinely ordained order—a moral wrong.  The recent trend of modern secu-
lar norms, including legal norms, has been decidedly in the opposite direc-
tion.  Put most simply, the positions of religious conscience and new social
norms are in direct conflict.
More than that, among those who have staked out definite positions one
way or another on same-sex marriage, such positions tend to be unusually
resistant to arguments coming from the other side, largely because the con-
tending positions proceed from fundamentally different worldviews and first
premises.  That is part of what makes the issue one of intense conflict
between religious conscience and current (or emerging) secular norms.
The claims of religious conscience in this area are straightforward and
easy to understand.  For many persons of faith, the problem—as in the con-
traception-abortion mandate cases, and as in the flag salute cases of the
1940s—is one of participation.  The question of conscience concerns whether
the believer must, in his or her own conduct, refrain from expressing or
implying support for or endorsement of, or giving assistance to, behavior in
conflict with the moral commands of his or her religious faith.  Thus, the
central concern of conscience for many traditional religious adherents is that
they wish not to make an affirmation in some form—whether express or
implied, by word or by deed—of what they regard as moral wrong.  They wish
not to affirm, by their own words or actions, the moral equivalence or propri-
ety of homosexual relationships (and in particular marriage, which many
religious persons regard as sacred and having a special status), for the reason
that they believe doing so would be an act of disloyalty or disobedience to
God’s commands.  To so act contrary to God’s law would, in the view of
many, be to betray their religious principles and fundamental faith commit-
ments.  For many persons of faith, this is a genuine and very serious religious
conflict.87
GERGIS, RYAN T. ANDERSON, & ROBERT GEORGE, WHAT IS MARRIAGE?  MAN AND WOMAN: A
DEFENSE (2012).
86 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
87 For many religious believers, the question of where the moral lines are properly
drawn is a difficult and uncomfortable one.  Sometimes competing religious principles are
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The claim of authority on the other side is also fairly easy to understand,
but nonetheless requires some untangling of its discrete strands.  The gov-
ernment’s interest is cast, reasonably enough, in terms of protecting persons
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or same-sex union in
the provision of goods and services in the commercial marketplace.  But this
general interest in banning discrimination straddles two sub-interests: the
interest in assuring that (certain) commercial goods and services are available
to an individual or couple, irrespective of sexual orientation, conduct, or
union; and a somewhat distinct interest in enforcing the social norm of nondis-
crimination itself, whether or not a person’s discriminatory conduct actually
affects the availability of goods and services to someone in the protected
class.  This sub-interest is, in form, an interest in prohibiting “discrimina-
tion.”  In substance, however, it sometimes amounts to a claim of authority to
compel precisely the kind of affirmation-by-conduct that the religious adher-
ent wishes to withhold, and to do so for the sake of enforcing social conform-
ity.  In the context of same-sex marriage specifically, the objective may be
(and often is) to punish as a violation of law—and thereby ultimately to
delegitimize, stigmatize, and eliminate—social opposition to the equal moral
status for same-sex sexual relationships and marriages, including opposition
flowing from religious conviction.  This objective may exist as an indepen-
dent goal of the non-discrimination law, and might be advanced irrespective
of whether access to goods or services has been impaired or not.
These two sub-interests are present in all types of nondiscrimination
laws.  Part of such a law’s purpose is practical and part of it is ideological.
The two interests are not always carefully distinguished from one another,
and sometimes converge in application.  Analytically, however, they are two
different types of justification for antidiscrimination laws, with potentially dif-
ferent implications for government’s claimed authority to override private
religious conscience.  The concrete, practical justification for antidiscrimina-
tion laws is to achieve access: they are for the direct benefit of specific per-
sons or groups.  The ideological justification is to change society and
attitudes: antidiscrimination laws in part seek to punish discriminatory con-
duct, irrespective of any concrete harm to any person or group (other than,
perhaps, symbolic or stigmatic harm), simply for the sake of overcoming
opposition to the social norm of nondiscrimination in question.88  That is
often a good thing: often, antidiscrimination laws seek to vindicate a princi-
at work; men and women of good faith may reconcile those principles differently, and
individuals may be conflicted as to how to apply them in a given situation.  Probably for
most such religious believers, it is not a case of hostility to homosexuals as persons.  Very
often the reverse is the case: a religious ethic of empathetic love is the dominant sentiment
and the difficulty lies in how to reconcile that instinct with the seemingly contrary, clear
moral commands of one’s faith.  As with any other issue of religious conscience, therefore,
different persons and groups will draw their lines in different places; that does not render
any of such conscientious views any the less worthy of respect and legal protection from
compulsion to act contrary to conscience.
88 This is not to deny that stigmatic harms can be real and important; it is merely to
note that they are distinctive injuries of a different nature and character from other inju-
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ple, purely for the sake of that principle.  In much the same way, claims of
conscience often seek to adhere to principle purely for the sake of that
principle.
The problem occurs when fundamental principles collide.  In the case of
same-sex marriage and attendant nondiscrimination laws, the operative non-
discrimination interest is, often, precisely such an interest in vindicating a
new social norm and overriding social opposition to that norm.  The interest
at work is not—at least not always—one of assuring the ability of such per-
sons actually to obtain access to a service not otherwise available except by
means of coercing persons with an objection based on religious conscience.
Typically, in the cases that have made their ways into courts or administrative
hearing, the service sought—a wedding photographer, cake designer, flower
arranger, marriage concierge or coordinator, or adoption agency—has been
available from another provider who does not have a conscientious objection
to any affirmation implicit in provision of such services.89  In some cases, the
party complaining of discrimination is in reality a “tester,” without genuine
interest in receiving the service from the religious person or entity being
tested but only an interest in enforcing the nondiscrimination norm.  The
object of legal actions brought against persons declining to perform such ser-
vices because of moral objections to doing so is to coerce by force of law
conduct contrary to religious conscience, or to drive dissenters from the mar-
ketplace, precisely because the stance of religious conscience is itself thought
morally intolerable by the person bringing the discrimination complaint, and
by the state.
In such cases, conflict is inevitable and accommodation of conscience
difficult.  As Robert George observes:
Thus, advocates of redefinition [of marriage] are increasingly open in
saying that they do not see disputes about sex and marriage as honest dis-
agreements among reasonable people of goodwill.  They are, rather, battles
between the forces of reason, enlightenment, and equality, on one side, and
those of ignorance, bigotry, and discrimination, on the other.  The “exclud-
ers” are to be treated just as racists are treated—since they are the equivalent
of racists.
. . .
ries. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752–61 (1984) (distinguishing the types of
injury alleged to result from racial discrimination).
89 See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F. 3d 1109, 1140 (9th Cir. 2009) (challenging the
constitutionality of rules that could allow pharmacists to refuse to provide medication for
reasons that include conscience); Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. 14CA1351,
2015 WL 4760453 (Colo. App. Aug. 13, 2015); Catholic Charities v. State, No. 2011-MR-254
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2011) (order denying stay); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309
P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); McCarthy v. Liberty Ridge Farm, LLC, Nos. 10157952, 10157963
(N.Y. Div. Hum. Rts. July 2, 2014), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/sites/default/files/
140808_DHR_LRF_Ruling.pdf (ordering that farmers must host same-sex weddings);
Manya A. Brachear, 3 Dioceses Drop Foster Care Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-11-15/news/ct-met-catholic-charities-foster-care-201111
15_1_civil-unions-act-catholic-charities-religious-freedom-protection.
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There is, in my opinion, no chance—no chance—of persuading champi-
ons of sexual liberation . . . that they should respect, or permit the law to
respect, the conscience rights of those with whom they disagree.  Look at it
from their point of view: Why should we permit “full equality” to be trumped
by bigotry?  Why should we respect religions and religious institutions that
are “incubators of homophobia”?  Bigotry, religiously based or not, must be
smashed and eradicated.  The law should not give it recognition or lend it
any standing or dignity.90
More so even than in the healthcare contraception-abortion drug cover-
age context, the debate here is between conscience and the avowed enemies of
its invocation in this situation.  How should the conflict between conscience
and authority be resolved, in this context—one that is virtually certain to be a
prime battleground over the next several years?  Robert George is surely right
in his diagnosis: on the premises of same-sex-marriage (or “marriage equal-
ity”) proponents, it is no more tolerable to tolerate religious conscience, in
opposition to this new social norm, than it would be to tolerate similar dis-
crimination on the basis of race.  But is George right in his prescription—
that the only solution for traditional religious adherents is to defeat the
movement for same-sex marriage (and nondiscrimination) itself—that “there
is no alternative to winning the battle in the public square over the legal
definition of marriage”?91
If so, then this war between private conscience and state authority was
decided by the Supreme Court’s holding in Obergefell in June 2015, creating a
constitutional right to same sex-marriage.92 Obergefell purported to reserve
these issues of conscience.93  If Robert George is right, however, this battle
will occur after the war is really over.  In a passage addressing the issue of
religious conscience, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Obergefell says this:
Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to
religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere convic-
tion that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned.
The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are
given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfil-
ling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations
to continue the family structure they have long revered.94
Stripped of rhetorical flourish and fluff, this passage does not concede
much ground to conscientious conduct, based on one’s religious conviction,
in opposition to the new (constitutional) social norm of same-sex marriage.
People who disagree with the new institution may continue to “advocate”
90 GEORGE, supra note 1, at 144–45.
91 Id. at 145.
92 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
93 See id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority attempts . . . to reassure those
who oppose same-sex marriage that their rights of conscience will be protected.”).
94 Id. at 2607 (majority opinion).
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what they believe.  And religious organizations are given “proper” protection
(only?) as they “teach” what they believe.
The narrowness of these meager words of reassurance was not lost on
the Obergefell dissenters.  Chief Justice Roberts noted that the Court’s decision
“creates serious questions about religious liberty.  Many good and decent
people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith, and their freedom to
exercise religion is—unlike the right imagined by the majority—actually
spelled out in the Constitution.”95  Roberts sarcastically observed that Ken-
nedy’s majority opinion “graciously suggests” a freedom to “advocate” and
“teach”—a freedom that no one could reasonably dispute—but says not a
word about the true issues of conflict with religious conscience: “the freedom
to ‘exercise’ religion.”96  Will religious organizations adhering to traditional
views on sexual conduct and marriage find their tax-exempt status chal-
lenged?  Will a religious college be required to include same-sex couples in
its married-student housing opportunities?  “There is little doubt that these
and similar questions will soon be before this Court.  Unfortunately, people
of faith can take no comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority
today.”97  Justice Clarence Thomas similarly bemoaned the Court’s “weak
gesture toward religious liberty” and argued that religious freedom must
include “freedom of action” in matters of religion, not just freedom to advo-
cate or teach.98  Justice Samuel Alito expressed deep skepticism over the
majority’s assurances to “those who oppose same-sex marriage that their
rights of conscience will be protected.  We will soon see whether this proves
to be true,” he wrote.99  Justice Antonin Scalia joined each of these three
other dissents.100
There is reason to be concerned about the fate of religious conscience
in the face of Obergefell.  The movement for same-sex marriage is, at the time
of this writing, a social tidal wave—and traditional religious adherents are
standing on the beaches, defying the waters.  There is every reason to believe,
given historical experience, that the claims of authority to compel conformity
will overwhelm and drown the claims of conscience, in such a social and legal
context as this.
Predictions aside, what is the correct answer to the problem of con-
science-versus-authority in the same-sex marriage context?  Though specific
95 Id. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 2626.
98 Id. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting).
100 See id. at 2611, 2631, 2640.  For a discussion of Obergefell and its dangerous implica-
tions for liberty of religious conscience, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Wreckage of
Obergefell, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2015, http://www.firstthings.com/article/2015/10/the-wreck
age-of-obergefell.  On the need to reexamine the Court’s reading of the Free Exercise
Clause, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Justice Scalia’s Worst Opinion, PUB. DISCOURSE (Apr. 17,
2015), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/04/14844/, and Michael Stokes Paul-
sen, The Stakes of Free Exercise, PUB. DISCOURSE (Aug. 13, 2015), http://
www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/08/15439/.
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applications may be difficult, I submit that the correct general principles are
as follows—and are exactly as described above with respect to the flag salute
cases.
First, government must take claims of religious conscience on their own
terms, and treat them with respect.101  It will not do simply to dismiss or
disparage religious conscientious objection to endorsing or supporting same-
sex marriage or homosexual relationships as nothing more substantial than
discrimination for its own sake or (in the language of earlier gay-rights cases)
a “bare . . . desire to harm” others.102  The claim of religious conscience,
made in good faith (so to speak) and not as a pretense, should be entitled to
a presumption of validity.  Government may not simply dismiss such claims as
improper ones for a believer to hold, or refuse to credit them because the
lines that various believers will draw in this regard may vary from one
another, and may even appear (to government) as not consistent or princi-
pled.103  Moreover, given Hobby Lobby, it must be recognized that genuine
claims of religious conscience legitimately can arise even in the context of
commercial business enterprises.  Claims of conscience in such context can-
not be disparaged simply because the organization in question is not a
church or a specifically religious enterprise.
Second, exactly as noted with respect to flag salute cases, government
has no proper interest in coercing conduct in violation of conscience—and
especially not expressive conduct—simply for the purpose of requiring indi-
viduals to affirm, embrace, or endorse the state’s ideology.104  There may be
times where government’s interests in protecting others, or the public good,
should prevail over claims of religious conscience, but the state has no
proper interest in overriding private conscience simply for the sake of sym-
bolically vindicating the state’s authority over religious conscience.  This
principle has special salience in the nondiscrimination law context where, as
just noted, there are intertwined but distinct sub-interests at work, including
both an interest in access to goods and services and an interest in vindicating
the nondiscrimination norm for its own sake.  To the extent the interests can
be separated from each other, only the former should ever constitute a justifi-
cation for overriding conscience.  Where government’s interest in enforcing
a nondiscrimination norm reduces to a symbolic interest in vindicating gov-
ernment’s authority to subordinate religious conscience and conduct to gov-
ernment’s conception of the right, true, and good—put differently, where
government’s interest is purely one of requiring religious conscience to bow
to secular authority, as in the flag salute cases—the nondiscrimination norm
should yield to religious conscience.
101 See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
102 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (quoting
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
103 See, e.g., supra note 79 and accompanying text.
104 See supra Part II (discussing Gobitis and Barnette).
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To recall the Court’s words in Barnette: “[N]o official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.  If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do
not now occur to us.”105  To the extent nondiscrimination norms with
respect to same-sex marriage are sought to be enforced against sincere relig-
ious conscience, solely to vindicate the nondiscrimination norm, such an
assertion of authority should be rejected.106
Third, in evaluating conflicts between religious conscience and secular
authority to impose nondiscrimination requirements for the sake of assuring
access to services, the government’s interest must be both extraordinarily
important and specific to the situation, not a blanket generalization.  The
claimed injury resulting from conscientious conduct must truly be one that is
so intolerable in its effects on third parties as to make it essentially inconceiv-
able that it actually could be a true religious command—or, in Robert
George’s terms, a “[g]ross evil” or “grave injustice” as judged by absolute
standards of natural law.107  Different people may well reach different con-
clusions in different situations under this standard.  But I believe that it at
least poses the right question.
CONCLUSION: THE PRIORITY OF CONSCIENCE
In a set of pivotal chapters on conscience, smack dab in the middle of
the book, Robert George says this:
Let me conclude with a few words about the centrality and one might
even say priority of religious freedom among the basic civil liberties.
Observed from a certain perspective, any basic liberty might be assigned a
kind of priority: free speech, for example, which is so essential to the enter-
prise of republican government (and, in truth, good government of any
kind); or freedom of association and assembly; or the right of self-defense
and defense of one’s family and community.  The collapse of any of these
rights would place all the others in jeopardy.
Still, there is a special sense in which freedom of religion has priority or
at least a sort of pride of place . . . because it protects an aspect of our
flourishing as human persons that is architectonic to the way we lead our
lives.108
105 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
106 On this principle, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), upholding the withdrawal of tax-exempt status from a private
religious school because of the school’s (concededly) religiously based policies forbidding
interracial dating and marriage among members of its community of faith, was wrongly
decided.  I have argued that Bob Jones University was wrongly decided in other writing,
including the first law review article I ever wrote, for the Notre Dame Law Review. See
Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to
Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 362–68 (1986).
107 See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 124.
108 Id. at 113.
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Religion, George continues, is “not the only basic human good.”  Nor
are all other basic human goods merely means to the ends of religion.  “But
religion is an intrinsic and constitutive aspect of our integral flourishing as
human persons and also a good that shapes and integrates all the other
intrinsic and constitutive aspects of human well-being and fulfillment.”109
It follows, George contends, that
respect for a person’s well-being, or more simply respect for the person,
demands respect for his or her flourishing as a seeker of religious truth and
as a man or woman who lives in line with his or her best judgments of what is
true in spiritual matters.  And that, in turn, requires respect for his or her
liberty in the religious quest—the quest to understand religious truth and
order one’s life in line with it.110
This is a powerful and important insight.  And it is one that is, to some
extent, lost in our contemporary society.  Religion is of fundamental impor-
tance to human flourishing, George correctly insists.  But at the same time,
the importance of religion is vehemently denied today—by many persons, by
our dominant secular institutions, and often by our governments.  Religious
freedom is vital to the flourishing of religion, George correctly reasons.  But
at the same time, that freedom is refused, compromised, disparaged.
Respect for religious freedom has faded as appreciation of the fundamental
importance of religion to human flourishing has waned.
Today’s wars over claims of religious conscience are the tangible, legal
manifestations of society’s broader wars over the value of religion itself.
There are those who would—to put it bluntly and perhaps a bit uncharita-
bly—kill religion, if they could.  For such persons, no claim of religious lib-
erty should ever prevail over society’s laws or against societal values arrayed
against religious conviction.  The idea that religious conviction is founda-
tional to flourishing and that religious freedom should have priority among
basic human rights, is, for them, anathema.  For such persons, quite the
reverse is true: religious conviction is fundamentally harmful, and religious
freedom should not have priority but should be subordinated to every other
value.111
109 Id.  In the essay that follows this one in the book, George picks up the same theme,
setting forth a marvelously rich understanding of what religion is:
In its fullest and most robust sense, religion is the human person’s being in right
relation to the divine—the more than merely human source or sources, if there
be such, of meaning and value.  . . . [I]n the ideal of perfect religion, the person
would understand as comprehensively and deeply as possible the body of truths
about spiritual things and would fully order his or her life, and share in the life of
a community of faith that is ordered, in line with those truths.  In the perfect
realization of the good of religion, one would achieve the relationship that the
divine—say God himself, assuming for a moment the truth of monotheism—
wishes us to have with Him.
Id. at 118.
110 Id. at 119.
111 For an example of such a position (and a critical review of it), see Paulsen, supra
note 20.
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There are, in short, true enemies of religious conscience.
Against the modern march of such enemies of conscience, Robert
George stands as an impressive one-man battalion of resistance, championing
the value of religion and asserting the indispensability of its protection.
“Religion can,” he concludes one essay, “contribute to both the theory and
practice of resistance,” where religion provides healthy prophetic witness:
“This is one more reason to cherish religious freedom and to push back hard
against forces that threaten to erode or diminish it—especially when the
threats come from overreaching governments.”112
112 GEORGE, supra note 1, at 114.
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